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Abstract – This chapter investigates the discourse of the EU law-enforcement agency, 
Europol, and the ways in which trust, ethics and ideology are engaged in communication 
in order to achieve institutional legitimation through the discursive construction of 
‘danger’ and ‘emergencies’. The analysis considers a corpus of annual reports published 
over the last ten years (2008-2018). The relationship between the production of security 
discourse, institutional responsibility and credibility will show how trust discourse can be 
either rooted in insecurity or safety and deeply rely on the categories of ethics and 
ideology, according to the specific circumstances and communicative needs of the 
organisation. Quantitative and qualitative findings will reveal how lexical and 
phraseological key features, as well as a dichotomy created through the use of polarisation 
strategies, can shape contrasting ingroup or outgroup identities/roles, alternatively feeding 
credibility or discredit, on the issue of safeguarding European security. This linguistic 
interplay will discursively extricate the harmful potential of criminal forces’ ideological 
agenda, legitimise repressive control measures as ethically acceptable, as well as empower 
Europol’s trustworthy image and propagandise its beneficial role in the fight against crime 
and terrorism.  
 






This chapter explores the relationship between discursive practices in the 
context of European societal security and the categories of trust, ideology and 
ethics. The study is based on a corpus of annual reports published from 2008 
to 2018 by the EU law enforcement agency Europol, whose decisions and 
modalities of action not only form the basis of European security discourse, 
but also involve issues of supra-national social control, while shaping a 
‘security identity’ (Waever 1995). In this way, security is discursively 
interconnected with the legitimation of identity, credibility and trust among 
the national authorities (Candlin, Crichton 2013).  
 




The interference of organized crime and terrorism in the EU context 
has contributed to social insecurity and represents the most serious threat to 
the wellbeing of Member States, where cooperation and coordination have 
not effectively met a common response, in terms of the perception of danger 
and institutional analysis of the problem (Baker-Beall 2014, 2016). Hence, in 
the conceptualisation of European security, intelligence measures and 
operations may background the ideal of ethical behaviour and be discursively 
legitimised through the voice of institutional expertise and reliability, with a 
view to promoting institutional trustworthiness among European citizens in 
the ‘war on terror’ (Jarvis 2009), as well as in exhibiting a certain 
organisational conduct to pre-empt the escalation of specific threats.  
As a matter of fact, the role of trust and credibility is embedded in the 
formation and maintenance of relationships among law-enforcement 
institutions, Member States and people, as well as in the ethical cooperation 
and exchange of investigative practices in the fight against crime and 
terrorism. Since trust not only involves institutional responsibility, but also 
moral credibility and recognition, it can be mediated through strategic 
communication in the production of security discourse and sourced by the 
appeal to a shared set of values either rooted in insecurity or in safety; 
similarly, trust can be variously fed or depressed by the authorship’s 
discursive representation of emergencies and the audience’s acceptance of 
control measures.  
Security discourse also engages a two-fold dimension of ‘security 
identity’, which comprises the supranational self representation of the law-
enforcement agency and the description of other national intelligence 
partners when engaged in combating criminal organisations. The ideological 
sense of ‘togetherness’ and cooperative behaviour between supranational and 
national entities necessarily include the ways in which these representations 
of the self and the other may strategically emerge or not in the discursive 
release of documents about security. For this reason, the supranational law-
enforcement agency may project itself within the community by disclosing its 
proactive role in accomplishing its security mission or by putting on a good 
face in the case of failure. It may also shift blame onto other intelligence 
partners for having lacked an adequate sense of cooperation. 
For this reason, the aim of the study is to investigate how, during the 
dissemination process, law-enforcement communication realises trust, ethics 
and ideology in security reports and the strategies deployed at the 
institutional level in shaping the discourse of security, in order to serve a 
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2. Theoretical framework: trust, ethics and ideology in 
security issues 
 
It is well-known that the socio-political environment, ethical ‘frames’ and 
ideologies affect the dynamics of institutional knowledge and the production 
of discourse (Kress 2010, p. 19), and in so doing, regulate the standards of 
conduct or organisational practices (Downe et al. 2016, p. 898). In setting 
operational guidelines and issuing policies at the communicative level within 
the institutional agency or body, specific conduct can be endorsed or 
sanctioned and the dimension of trust also be engaged in order to shape 
people’s views of other people/groups, make cohesion, and build cooperative 
relations (Gambetta 1988; Good 1988). This is a relevant feature which 
particularly affects the delivery of texts about ideologically and ethically 
relevant issues because of their stringent implications in specific sectors, such 
as public security. Good (1988, p. 31) explains how  
 
In the analysis of trust, we are inevitably drawn to the complex two-way 
interrelationships between it, in the economic and political fabric of society, 
and the individuals who constitute that society. On the one hand we may be 
concerned with its role in the creation of that fabric and its psychological 
impact on the individual, and on the other we may be concerned with how that 
fabric and the properties of those individuals can serve to maintain trust and 
any associated cooperative behaviours. 
 
Especially in the security environment, the role that trust plays on individuals 
and institutional bodies impacts on their behaviours and actions, thus 
involving 
 
[…] a modality of human action: a more or less consciously chosen policy for 
handling the freedom of other human agents or agencies. As a passion, a 
sentiment, it can be evanescent or durable. But as a modality of action it is 
essentially concerned with coping with uncertainty over time. (Dunn 1988, p. 
73) 
  
Such binary dynamics operated by trust between the behaviour of agents and 
the role of agencies have attracted scholars’ attention (Candlin, Crichton 
2013; Downe et al. 2016; Gambetta 1988; Good 1988; Hood 2011; Wenger 
1998) both in terms of ontological conceptualisation and in the exploration of 
the communicative strategies engaged to build a trustworthy relationship 
between organizations and individuals. Good (1988, p. 33) considers the 
notion of trust as based on an individual/group’s set of beliefs as to someone 
else’s action or conduct in a potential future situation, while Candlin and 
Crichton (2013, p. 2) observe that “trust is always associated with 
expectations about the behaviour of others that may be more or less 




founded”, and at the same time has an impact on knowledge production. 
Candlin and Crichton (2013, pp. 9-13) also highlight trust’s discursive 
reliance on intention and choice, its negotiation through conscious strategic 
communication and the involvement of role, responsibility and accountability 
associated with any type of identity; they argue that trust encompasses 
credibility and recognition based on confidence, as well as connotes 
social/institutional influence, either enabling or inhibiting authority. 
Along with trust, ethics has become an integral component in the 
transfer of knowledge (Garzone, Sarangi 2007), because it delineates 
questions of correct conduct, particularly in the public sphere, and facilitates 
the empowerment of ideology in the subsequent implementation of 
institutional policies (van Dijk 2000). In fact, ethics exerts influence on 
groups/individuals in issuing guidance about the appropriate conduct to be 
undertaken, through the sanctioning of negative role models or the 
endorsement of exemplary behaviour (Joyce 2014). Ethics may also 
correspond to group-established standards and be imposed on its members as 
a means of regulating and setting limits on social behaviours (especially those 
conducts which represent violations or offences against public security), and 
as such it may be connected to ideology when it positively/negatively 
enhances  
 
socially shared beliefs that are associated with the characteristic properties of a 
group, such as their identity, their position in society, their interests and aims, 
their relations to other groups, their reproduction, and their natural 
environment. (van Dijk 2000, p. 12) 
 
Taken together, ethics and ideology provide the context and medium through 
which people create, maintain and change power and social relations, thus 
legitimising group conventions and actions in a specific situation or particular 
domain of action. Ideology in particular, considered as a system of ideas and 
ideals socially shaping discourses and practices, may give its contribution to 
organise attitudes, opinions and even prejudices among the members of a 
group about the negative properties or conduct of others (van Dijk 2000, pp. 
14-15), thus generating conflict or struggle. 
Several studies have also demonstrated how ethics and ideology can be 
pivotal in the framing of institutional or professional identity (Loseke 2007; 
Simon 2004; Spencer Oatey 2007) and the achievement of discursive 
reliability. Consequently, discourses of trust and the communicative 
strategies (Hansson 2015, p. 299) used to address public concern about 
contemporary societal issues may enhance the effectiveness of institutional 
power in action, and be representative features of ethical/ideological security 
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when people place their trust in systems, they implicitly place trust in the 
experts associated with those systems, and as a consequence this expert status, 
articulated in the form of specialist knowledge and expertise, becomes a 
source of power for the system and for some of the actors that inhabit it. 
However, this expertise status, and the associated invoking of trust in the 
system as a whole, may be jeopardised if actors and systems fail to deliver 
expected outcomes. (Candlin, Crichton 2013, p. 3) 
 
In this way, at the same time that knowledge is disseminated, trust-bearing 
discourse can help to construct, constrain or jeopardise the idea of an ethical 
identity, as well as enable community identification, and ideology can be 
used at the institutional level to emphasise or lessen meanings of self-
presentation or other-presentation (Hansson 2015, 2017; Hood 2011; Prosperi 
Porta 2018, 2019; van Dijk 2000, 2006; Weaver 1995), when there is the 
need to prevent the loss of trust, to ethically/ideologically empower 
legitimacy and facilitate cooperation among public authorities.  
To this end, ideology can be functional to the polarisation of group 
behaviours in positive and negative ways (van Dijk 2000, p. 37) when the 
authorship aims at endorsing institutional action as inescapable, at making 
acceptable group dominance and at feeding trust and confidence, especially 
in those “situations in which significant groups within a society feel 
threatened […] and try to defend themselves” (Waever 1995, p. 60), such as 
in matters of European societal security, where for ideological reasons, 
discourse  
 
[…] constructs an issue as an ‘existential’ threat. By labelling something as a 
‘security’ issue gives it a certain sense of importance and urgency that 
legitimises the use of extraordinary measures beyond the norms and practices 
of everyday politics. (Baker-Beall 2016, p. 192) 
 
Hence, policies may be successfully conveyed appealing to a strong sense of 
insecurity and uncertainty, by a negative representation of ‘otherness’ 
(negative group polarisation) considered as a threat to security or by positive 
institutional self-representation (positive group polarisation) that normalises a 
repressive response to crime and consolidates institutional image and public 
recognition. The speech act of labelling something as ‘security’ may lead “to 
specific ways of addressing it: threat, defence, and […] solutions” (Waever 
1995, p. 58), at times even encouraging the idea that some threats exceed any 
possible control (Baker-Beall 2014, 2016; Jarvis 2009). Thus, the connection 
between precautionary security, exceptional measures and ideological 
institutional engagement enables the identification of the agency with the 
promises of implementing effective solutions for the common good of 
people, and at the same time places trust in the ‘securitisation’ of a problem. 
The institution may deliberately create a constant feeling of threat to feed 




confidence, as well as emphasise commitment in a very complex system of 
power-relationships, with a view to ensuring Member States’ compliance 
(Jocak, Kochenov 2017). The authorship can recur to other discursive tools 
such as modalities legitimising authority, value judgments and anticipative 
strategies of defence in case of any possible blame endangering the law-
enforcement agency’s construction of a reliable ‘security identity’ (Waever 
1995, p. 65). 
In using conscious defensive practices, the authorship may endorse 
public policies appealing to credibility. Trustworthiness can be ideally 
validated by institutional recognition and driven by ideology. 
Therefore, the national and supranational relations among law-
enforcement intelligence and its partners involve different dynamics in 
articulating trust discourse, in terms of how it is sourced, projected and may 
be perceived. The following Sections will explore Europol’s shaping of trust 
discourse and its connections with ethics and ideology in the realisation of the 
EU agency’s leadership, as well as in the projection of an accountable 
institutional identity and in the codification of appropriate response or 
behaviour to danger. 
 
 
3. Corpus and Methodology 
  
The corpus is made up of Annual Reports, published from 2008 to 2018 by 
Europol, whose first issue follows the creation of the European Police office 
body and the commencement of the agency’s activities in the field of defence 
and security. The corpus amounts to 189,881 tokens and 29,809 types.  
Europol’s reports are documents issued by highly-trained experts and 
aim at providing strategic analysis directed to warding off serious and 
organised crime and terrorism in Europe; they also promote the agency’s 
mission of facilitating cooperation and effectively implementing control 
measures among Member States’ law-enforcement authorities. In the EU, the 
report genre can be considered as an institutionalised form of communication 
which guides the social activities of various institutional communities of 
practice (Prosperi Porta 2018, p. 17). 
In the European context of security, the presentation of discourse is 
targeted either at operators in the field or the lay public; the argumentation of 
facts and figures accounts for the agency’s achievements, the latest 
intelligence methodologies and techniques used in crime assessment. 
Documents are released on an annual basis and are available to the public on 
Europol’s website (Prosperi Porta 2018, 2019). 
The quantitative analysis relies on current corpus-assisted discourse 
studies (Baker 2006; Bondi, Scott 2010; Hunston 2002; Partington 2004, 
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salience of words that topicalise institutional trust, ethics and ideology in 
Europol’s group argumentation, so as to shed light on how discourse can be 
ideologically oriented and engage the idea of a trustworthy supranational 
body. Analogously, the discursive topicalisation of trust could be morally 
aimed at favouring cooperation among law-enforcement partners and be 
sublimated into commitment to security in order to persuade the target 
audience. To this end, quantitative data related to argumentation about 
security issues will be obtained with the support of the software Concapp5 
(Grieves 2005).  
The qualitative analysis instead, aims at exploring the discursive 
strategies empowering ideology (polarized group representation, evaluation, 
rhetorical devices) and legitimation techniques (defence strategies, modalities 
legitimising authority, securitisation discourse), developed by Europol, with 
the aim of building, maintaining or restoring trust in the circumstances of 
blame or legitimising their institutional role and actions as ‘ethical’, with a 
view to making them acceptable to recipients.  
 
 
4. Crime strategic analysis in Europol’s reports  
 
Europol is a EU agency, active in the fight against the different forms of 
contemporary crime, including among its major issues a special focus on 
terrorism.  
Europol’s relationship with Member States’ partners has achieved an 
increased importance since 2009, becoming progressively prominent in 2013, 
and re-defined in the period 2014-18, so as to cover under the same umbrella 
many relevant EU institutions, agencies and their strategic activities. 
Since 2008, Europol has published its Annual Reports in order to 
provide law-enforcement partners, and the public, with an overview of the 
agency’s different activities in the field of EU-wide criminal intelligence 
knowledge. The dissemination of strategic counter-crime analysis led to the 
exchange of data through a consolidated type of document, so as to have 
rapid feedback and supra-nationally guide operations and implement policies 
in the law-enforcement community. It also informs the wider readership 
about the agency’s activities and achievements. 
The oldest documents (2008-2010) are the most extensive, while the 
latest editions (2011-2018) present a significantly simplified structure and 
show a progressive reduction in their length, foregrounding particular issues, 
such as terrorism and cybercrime. Quite unexpectedly, following Europol’s 
recent establishment as the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation in 2017, the 2018 report was further abbreviated to Europol in 
brief, which consists of a short summary of the former report genre. This 
change may be linked to a careful choice of standardising the key-areas of 




knowledge in the focus of institutional action and communication (in recent 
years, specific themes such as terrorism have been given larger prominence 
by the agency in the form of single monographic publications, probably in 
order to appeal more to the interests of the intended readership). It may also 
be revealing of other factors that are worth considering. In fact, it may 
indicate new policy changes and a possible variation in the selection of 
information to be shared, following the appointment of a new director in 
2018, or a progressive loss of popularity of texts/topics among the recipients. 
Perhaps, it may also signal a lessened degree of shared ‘security’ knowledge 
that could be effectively exchanged for best practice. It may unveil an 




5. Quantitative findings  
 
On the basis of the quantitative investigation, it can be said that some nouns, 
verbs and modifiers build Europol’s ideology and encompass ethics on a 
textual level, when propagandising a trustworthy and accountable 
institutional identity. Data have been collected according to their statistical 
degree of salience, as indicated in the following tables. 
 
5.1. Trust-building nouns 
  
As far as nouns are concerned, statistics have proved how some specific trust-
building nouns frequently mark discourse, as displayed in Table 1 below.  
 
Noun (2008-2018) Raw frequencies Relative frequency per 100 
tokens 
support 674 0.3478 
cooperation 512 0.2642 
terrorism 320 0.1651 
security 235 0.0697 
protection 166 0.0857 
expertise 148 0.0764 
coordination 139 0.0717 
capabilities 101 0.0521 
fight 79 0.0408 
surveillance 46 0.0237 
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The examination of nouns has revealed how Europol’s support (674 
instances, 0.3478%) to intelligence partners, cooperation (512 instances, 
0.2642%) among Member States and the fight (79 instances, 0.0408%) for 
societal security (231 instances, 0.1192%) register a relevant salience in the 
corpus, being in clear contrast with the very low occurrence of other nouns 
which could have been used more frequently to overtly build a trustworthy 
institutional ‘security identity’, as in the case of trust (14 instances, 0.0072%) 
and surveillance (46 instances, 0.0237%). However, it is interesting to note 
that, from an in-depth reading of the reports and an examination of 
frequencies on an annual basis, the occurrence of surveillance drastically 
dropped from 2015 onwards, following the Islamic State outbreak of 
simultaneous terrorist attacks. The quantitative reduction of surveillance 
could reflect, discursively, the negative impact of possible intelligence 
failures and the role played by institutional ideology in linguistically toning 
down or masquerading security errors. It may also signal a feasible sense of 
institutional inadequacy when adopting ineffective counter-measures against 
terrorism’s unpredictability, and to some extent, may be explained as a sign 
of trust decline, as indicated by a falling trend registered by trust, gradually 
decreasing from 2013 to 2015 and completely disappearing in 2016-2018 
(coinciding with the new rise of terrorist attacks since 2015).  
Since security relies on real sources of danger, statistical frequencies 
indicate the increased necessity for Europol to propagandise the notion of the 
fight (79 instances, 0.0408%) and protection (166 instances, 0.0857%), 
against the proliferation of terrorism (320 instances, 0.165%), among 
Member States, as well as the agency’s need to self-project as a leader in the 
coordination (139 instances, 0.0717%) of synergy with intelligence partners, 
and in the promotion of its analytical or operational capabilities (101 
instances, 0.0521%).  
 
5.2. Verbs constructing ‘security identity’ and ‘war on terror’ 
discourse  
 
In addition to nouns, some verbs appealing to the agency’s ethics and 
ideology in the accomplishment of law-enforcement duties, have been 
retrieved in the corpus. Past tenses are frequently used in the narrative, on the 
institutional side, to describe results and achievements against criminal hubs 
and constitute typical usage of ‘war on terror’ discourse (Baker-Beall 2014). 
The use of past forms helps Europol to successfully disseminate knowledge 
about its strategic activities, accomplished missions and contribute to shape 
public confidence. When some of these verbs are used in the present tense or 
infinitive form they can mark institutional continuity in the security 
commitment and feed positive expectations about institutional behaviour, 
which is frequently portrayed as resorting to the power of intelligence 




capabilities. A short list of the most salient infinitives/present and past forms 




Raw frequencies Relative frequency per 100 
tokens 
secure 143 0.073 
arrest 71 0.036 
combat 43 0.022 
check 37 0.019 
coordinate 34 0.017 
disrupt 34 0.017 
attack 28 0.014 
fight 28 0.014 
detect 21 0.010 
dismantle 19 0.009 
 
Table 2  





Raw frequencies Relative frequency per 100 
tokens 
seized 254 0.131 
arrested 180 0.092 
identified 155 0.080 
coordinated 108 0.055 
dismantled 76 0.039 
detected 24 0.012 
investigated 17 0.008 
checked 16   0.0083 
intercepted 15   0.0077 
disrupted 14   0.0072 
 
Table 3  
Past/ Past Participle forms constructing ‘security identity’ and ‘war on terror’ discourse.  
 
Linguistic evidence shows how trust, ethics and ideology permeate discourse 
when a word such as terrorism collocates with the verbs related to the notion 
of battle (disrupt, combat, fight, attack, dismantle) and securitisation (secure, 
detect, arrest), therefore emphasising the societal vulnerability deriving from 
any absence of control, implicitly re-stating Europol’s core values and also 
the need to adopt severe repressive measures. As a result, most of the verbs 
presented in Tables 2 and 3 involve the idea of criminal destruction and 
detection so as to feature ‘war on terror’ discourse and de-legitimise terrorist 
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5.3. Evaluative modifiers constructing ‘security identity’  
 
Along with nouns and verbs, the use of lexis related to the leading role of 
Europol in the field of crime, of the agency’s operational timing and high-
expertise intelligence, often tracks the occurrence of evaluative modifiers 
(adjectives/adverbs) to positively represent institutional identity in the texts, 
as well as to project a trustworthy image of vigilance and efficient behaviour 
aimed at supporting institutional ideology. For this reason, the description of 
intelligence activities often results in the combination of modifiers with most 
nouns presented in Table 1, thus emphasising success and justifying the 
implementation of intense security measures for the common good of people. 




Evaluative modifiers constructing ‘security identity’. 
 
The use of evaluative modifiers ideally contributes to building a reliable 
institutional identity for Europol, as well as enhancing its image of 
‘securitisation’ and protection, thus feeding institutional consolidation and 
trust. However, apart from those modifiers registering the highest positions 
(new, significant, strategic), which highlight intelligence innovation, the 
agency also foregrounds its paramount role in the European law-enforcement 
environment in terms of operative timeliness, efficiency (timely, efficient, 
unique), as well as credits itself with expertise (specialised, valuable) against 
Evaluative modifier- adj. 
(2008-2018) 
Raw frequencies Relative frequency per 100 
tokens 
new 484 0.249 
strategic 204 0.146 
significant 126 0.065 
important 120 0.061 
high 94 0.048 
active 92 0.047 
successful 83 0.042 
relevant 76 0.039 
effective 66 0.034 
unique 60 0.031 
early 47 0.024 
specialised 46 0.023 
valuable 34 0.017 
timely 27 0.013 
efficient 24 0.012 
necessary 16 0.008 
strong 15 0.007 
intensive 11 0.005 




the different forms of criminality, with a view to positively affecting public 
trust and recognition. Quantitative findings also disclose the need to convey 
the existence of a ‘security identity’ which constantly and strenuously stays 
focused on the EU societal threats. As a matter of fact, the notion of fighting 
often interconnects with the reference to the intelligence voice of experience, 
by reason of ideologically supporting the problematisation of danger; 
similarly, the discursive act of managing threats as urgent issues feeds 
confidence in Europol’s role as a holistic security actor, whose strategic 
measures and capabilities are legitimised as ethically credible.   
 
 
6. Qualitative findings  
 
The qualitative investigation has aimed at identifying the discursive strategies 
deployed by Europol to shape security through the elicitation of institutional 
trust, ethics and ideology. The exploration of quantitative data has confirmed 
the use of group polarisation strategies in the texts (van Dijk 2000, pp. 34-36) 
to legitimise practice and expertise, as well as to propagandise Europol’s 
image and its ‘security identity’ (Waever 1995) in the EU. Strategies 
(Hansson 2017; Hood 2011) can also be utilised to direct the agency’s 
identity towards public consensus around its policies and positions, build 
trust, and push aside possible sources of blame.  
The rising emergence of new threats, particularly those regarding the 
implications of terrorism and people smuggling, has frequently 
conceptualised Europol as a trustworthy and efficient security actor, stressing 
the need to guide intelligence partners through cooperation and to adjust 
divergent or disharmonised conducts within the law-enforcement community. 
This need has obviously influenced the terms in which the agency has been 
projected in the reports to make its role acceptable to the readership when 
extraordinary repressive measures must be implemented. Therefore, the 
discursive representation of a proactive identity may be presented as 
consistently committed to successful operations as well as to European 
security, or emerge as skilfully driving the decisions of national authorities in 
the name of its authoritative experience and expertise. Through the agency 
appeal to operational uniformity, cooperation and coordination in the 
disruption of terrorism and other illicit activities, institutional ideology, role 
and values can be enforced as credible because they correspond to the 
specific urgency of some issues that are exhibited as unavoidable in terms of 
security behaviour. This feature is shown in examples (1) to (5). 
 
(1) From its founding roots in the early 1990s as the Europol Drugs Unit, the 
organisation has grown beyond all recognition and developed into an agency of 
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the field of law enforcement cooperation in Europe. It has unique crime-
fighting capabilities tailored to combat serious international crime and 
terrorism. European law enforcement agencies rely on Europol’s 24/7 
operational service centre. Europol employs some of the best criminal analysts 
in Europe, produces high-quality strategic and operational analysis and 
coordinates […] cross-border investigations each year. (EUROPOL 2008, p. 4) 
 
(2) Strengthened by a reform to its mandate and capabilities in 2010, Europol is 
pioneering a new response to these dangers. Europol acquired a new dynamic 
on 1 January 2010 when it became a fully-fledged European Union agency 
[…]. This has meant the implementation of a new strategy and new legal status 
with enhanced powers. As a result, Europol has become more open and 
accountable and its new legal framework will spell quicker […] cooperation 
between partners, which is especially important for police work. (EUROPOL 
2009, p. 4) 
 
(3) Europol has gained an improved position on the EU stage, partly thanks to the 
Lisbon Treaty, its new legal status, […] and to the agency’s own new strategy 
and improved capabilities. All of these developments make Europol a unique 
cooperation partner for EU law enforcement agencies and an important 
contributor to the EU decision-making process. (EUROPOL 2010, p. 60)  
 
(4) Europol provides expertise on the spot but also develops platforms for expert 
cooperation in a broad spectrum of law enforcement specialisations. Europol 
aims to be a pioneer in developing best practice as well as pooling European 
law enforcement expertise to support national investigations. (EUROPOL 
2012, p. 20) 
 
(5) Europol has been constantly improving its capabilities to ensure that its 
services are continuously available, providing round-the-clock support for its 
law enforcement partners. (EUROPOL 2016-17, p.64) 
 
In example 1 the narrative used is to construct Europol’s trusted identity 
(from its founding roots) according to developing stages which mark key 
dates in institutional image consolidation and recognition (has grown […] 
and developed into an agency […] occupying a central place in […] 
cooperation). The leading role in security issues and its operational 
empowerment is expressed by evaluative patterns (unique capabilities, best 
criminal analysts, high-quality strategic and operational analysis) which 
convey positive self-representation, while featuring group polarisation (van 
Dijk 2000, p. 18) between Europol’s ingroup intelligence partners and 
outgroup criminal members. Institutional values emerge in the ‘war’ attitude 
which clearly embodies group knowledge and ideology as applied to the 
security domain. It is worthy of note how intelligence powers are repeatedly 
and deliberately designated as capabilities (namely armament and people) in 
all the reports, thus evidencing the fact that in the mind of the institution a 
proper war has to be fought.  




The mention of capabilities and the idea of a strongly empowered identity 
having great potentials are also present in example 2, where trust is built 
through a sense of supra-national commitment (strengthened to its mandate), 
effectiveness and promptness (will spell quicker cooperation), as well as 
responsibility (accountable) to invest in. The evaluative modifier new which 
runs many times through the passage, features the agency in terms of 
innovation both at the operational and constitutive level (new response, new 
dynamic, new strategy, new legal status, new legal framework). Similarly, the 
notion of laying the groundwork (pioneering) for intense intelligence 
measures against dangers expresses the soundness of Europol’s indefatigable 
mission and its image is projected as a great addition to the European group 
of institutions.  
In example 3 the value of cooperation is associated with the 
representation of a leading institutional role (an improved position on the EU 
stage) which serves a trust-feeding function in the audience. Not only are the 
intelligence’s ground-breaking plan of action (own new strategy) and use of 
refined resources (improved capabilities) central to law-enforcement 
achievements, but it is also the agency’s special organization (unique 
cooperation partner), as well as its authoritative conduct (important 
contributor) which make synergic operations (decision-making process) 
possible for the sake of EU security. 
A comparable avant-garde approach (aims to be a pioneer) in 
investigations that is combined with immediacy of action (on the spot) is also 
shown in example 4, where cooperation and shared knowledge (pooling law 
enforcement expertise) efficaciously blend with the image of a capillary 
network and remarkable expertise, in view of supra-nationally shouldering 
the security burden to sustain national authorities.  
In a like manner, example 5 displays how the construction of a reliable 
‘security identity’ may also involve the institutional need for publicising 
permanent assistance (constantly improving its capabilities to ensure that its 
services are continuously available) and uninterrupted dedication (round-the-
clock support for its law enforcement partners), thus projecting a law-
enforcement image in the act of being caring, omnipresent and happy to oblige. 
In the constant attempt to realise a shared security, ingroup ‘security 
identity’ can be given special value and coupled with the ideological emphasis 
on institutional desire for a concrete working interaction between Europol and 
intelligence alliances, as shown in the following examples, 6 to 9. 
 
(6) It was a unique experience to see representatives from the Member States and 
other partners sitting together with Europol colleagues […] providing real time 
support to officers in the field, not only in the EU, but much wider. All of us, 
working day and night, with the simple aim of fighting serious and organised 
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(7) Europol is about a mind-set: a wish to effectively cooperate against terrorism and 
serious and organised crime and a wish to stand united against the multiple and 
increasingly complex threats to our internal security. (EUROPOL 2015, p. 46)  
 
(8) Being in the centre of EU security architecture, Europol is constantly 
upgrading its processes and capabilities to provide effective and timely 
reactions to evolving security threats. […] Europol had to react promptly to the 
new security challenges and focus its resources on the pressing operational 
needs. (EUROPOL 2015, p. 48) 
 
(9) Europol experts worked side-by-side with national authorities at the EU’s 
external borders to strengthen security checks on the inward flows of migrants, 
to disrupt migrant smuggling networks and identify suspected terrorists and 
criminals. […] Thanks to our presence in the hotspots, we have developed 
close and trusted working relationships in Italy. We all learned together how to 
best manage highly sensitive incidents, including responding to dozens of 
bodies being unloaded from rescue boats. Although professional relationships 
have always existed, the constant presence of Europol officers was the crucial 
ingredient that raised cooperation to the next level. (EUROPOL 2016-17, pp. 
22-23)  
 
Group identity is emphasised in example 6 through the discursive polarisation 
of community cooperation. In fact, the harmonious congregation of a united 
team (Member States and other partners sitting together with Europol 
colleagues) is featured as a special happening (unique experience), where all 
the participants prioritise the defeat of crime groups. Once again, the 
agency’s ideology aims at propagandising a positive image in the challenge 
of fulfilling its role promptly (providing real time support) as a universal 
security leader (not only in the EU, but much wider). As a result, while the 
law-enforcement range of action is ideally expanded, its objectives are 
conveniently announced as a basic security issue (simple aim of fighting [...] 
crime), and at the same time, ingroup cooperation and full-time commitment 
are inclusively marked (all of us working day and night […] together). 
In example 7 self-intended positive group polarisation from criminal 
forces strategically emerges to powerfully persuade the public about genuine 
institutional devotion, as well as in representing the group and its partners as 
a desirably united organization (a wish to stand united) with its beliefs and 
values (mind-set) which are functional to the fight against criminality. The 
agency’s legitimation as an accountable identity is expressed by the authorial 
inclusive stance enabled by discourse structures such as possessives, 
engaging the idea of a common institutional concern (our internal security). 
The presence of evaluative modifiers (in this case adverbs) not only generates 
reasonable expectations and trust (a wish to effectively cooperate against 
terrorism) about the single-minded dedication to law-enforcement action; it 
also boosts a sense of suspicion and concretely enhances the concept of 




danger (increasingly complex threats), with the aim of propagandising a 
shared cognition of national and supra-national joint operations.  
Sometimes, as shown in example 8, Europol’s self-representation may 
invoke one of the typical metaphors which have an immediate cognitive 
impact on the readership and have become formulaic patterns in the reports 
(Prosperi Porta 2019, pp. 145-146), to firmly anchor institutional position in 
the community of practice. In this case, the authorship displays the security 
architecture metaphor, in order to convey the image of the organisation’s 
structural stability as a shelter that guarantees protection and is the hub of 
intelligence (in the centre of EU security architecture) with which EU law-
enforcement partners and activities are connected. The need to legitimate 
security policies is also linked to the use of some verbs and evaluative 
modifiers implying that danger may occur unexpectedly (constantly 
upgrading its processes […] to evolving security threats) and for this reason, 
EU security requires an authoritative agency which comes to grips with 
problems (to react promptly […] and focus its resources on the pressing 
operational needs).   
 Analogously, the topicalization of trust, ethics and ideology is 
documented in example 9, where Europol strategically reproduces an image 
of intelligence coalition which adjusts or reduces any possible divergence 
(experts worked side-by-side […]. We have developed close and trusted 
working relationship. […]. We all learned together how to best manage), 
particularly when targeting illegal migration problems such as smuggling and 
the subsequent rising risk of terrorism. As a matter of fact, it is indisputable 
that migration has been a very sensitive issue in Mediterranean countries and 
can represent an evident source of supra-national concern and possible trust 
deterioration in the case of unsuccessful performance. Therefore, ethics and 
ideology play a central role when the humanitarian side of institutional 
behaviour is shown in the act of giving assistance and a shelter to refugees 
(responding to dozen of bodies […] unloaded from rescue boats), although 
constantly keeping the law-enforcement eye on those individuals who may 
have potentially adhered to terrorist ideals (identify suspected terrorists), as 
well as preventing those illegal migration-related activities from continuing 
(disrupt […] smuggling). Once again, self-representation reveals the need to 
underline the expertise pool embodied by Europol in constructing a ‘security 
identity’ and is consistent with the concept of a trustworthy leadership (our 
presence), whose expert contribution is considered as dramatically necessary 
to cooperative relations (the crucial ingredient […] to raise cooperation). In 
addition, illegal migration here establishes an ethical discursive link between 
terrorism as an “emotive act of violence” (Baker-Beall 2014, p. 217) and the 
problem of asylum policies, the latter for the fact of being transformed into a 





The discursive topicalisation of trust, ethics and ideology in European security issues 
perception may involve negative group polarisation of the other to de-
legitimise outgroup actions and promote self superiority. This is shown in the 
following examples 10, 11 and 12.  
 
(10) In 2016 terrorists once again demonstrated that the only thing needed to 
commit an attack is the will of a radicalised individual. Once Islamic State (IS) 
began to lose territory and the first signs of its defeat appeared, its leaders 
repeatedly called for IS supporters and followers to bring the war to the 
heartland of Europe and the US by committing terrorist attacks on the soil of 
coalition members. On top of that, IS operatives and fighters began [...] to enter 
Europe using - in some cases - the migration flows […]. Europe is faced with a 
mix of terrorist threats which cannot be dealt by the EU Member States alone. 
Europol also maintains a link between its terrorism and organized crime 
databases which enables swift, continuous cross-matching of information, and 
the establishment of links between investigations. This way a significant 
number of individuals were identified who had first been reported for 
organized crime activities and were later reported as terrorism suspects. […] 
Trusted teams and networks of experts are equally important in the timely 
exchange of information. (EUROPOL 2016-17, pp. 28-29)  
 
(11) Conscious of their disjointed appearance, the spin-off media outlets are 
increasingly aware of the need to appear more united and aim to project the 
image of an IS franchise. With this in mind, they are careful to produce 
propaganda that carries the hallmarks of IS and mimic the group’s official 
braggadocio. The need to appear more as a monolithic bloc and less like 
disparate groups […] is even more crucial in light of a long-standing 
ideological dispute – between the lesser and more radicals within IS – that is 
currently raging online. (EUROPOL 2018, pp. 12-13) 
 
(12) In addition to the territorial losses inflicted on IS over the past year, 2018 took 
its toll on the group’s digital presence. […] Islamic State has continued to 
suffer an aggravating crisis over 2018. The decimation of its quasi-state was 
coupled with major and coordinated attacks against its official propaganda 
machine. In particular, the disruption efforts […] have continued to curtail the 
group’s broadcasting capabilities, ensuring the wider public has less direct 
access to terrorist propaganda. As a result, propaganda produced by official IS 
media outlets has visibly declined - both in terms of quantity and quality. 
Moreover, its attempts to reach out to anglophone audiences have proved 
amateurish. […] The current conjuncture does provide a window of 
opportunity to capitalise on the organisation’s disarray. In particular, 
combating the group’s media network should remain a priority. (EUROPOL 
2018, p. 27)  
 
In example 10, Europol uses negative polarisation as a form of manipulation 
(van Dijk 2006) to reproduce ingroup trusted power (trusted teams of experts 
[…] in the timely exchange of information) and discredit the other group’s 
behaviour (leaders repeatedly called for IS supporters and followers to bring 
the war to the heartland of Europe), thus linking institutional commitment to 




legality (a significant number of individuals were identified), while raising 
the doubt in the readership about the existence of outgroup concealed 
terrorists (IS operatives and fighters began to enter Europe) who may take 
advantage of migratory flows just to spread violent extremism. In this way 
the authorship skilfully anticipates an additional threat worth of being doubly 
securitised (first reported for organised crime activities […] and later 
reported as terrorism suspects), although the process of connecting migration 
to terrorism may be debatable.  
Example 11 illustrates an instance of negative polarisation as applied to 
the inappropriate propaganda use of different labels and need for re-
mediatisation affecting the outgroup image of jihadist terrorists. In this case, 
negative representation of jihadists (either Islamic State or al-Quaeda 
terrorists) is rendered through the idea of a fragmented identity as a group 
(conscious of their disjointed appearance), which is in Europol’s mind 
clearly far from a close-knit terrorist network. Therefore, outgroup is shown 
as failing to deliver a unified ideological position (long-standing ideological 
dispute); IS ideology and organisation here are featured with all its 
inconsistencies (less like disparate groups) deriving from a dishomogeneous 
situation (need to appear more as a monolithic bloc). Consequently, the 
other’s internal attrition (long-standing […] dispute) is unveiled and 
communication is ridiculed as self-referential and boastful (propaganda that 
[…] mimic the group’s official braggadocio). In this way, institutional 
identity can skilfully emerge and its role gains ground. 
In another instance, in example 12, the focus is on the Islamic State’s 
(IS) bad and inexpert utilization of internet resources for the indoctrination of 
followers (propaganda […] has visibly declined […] in […] quantity and 
quality), so as to juxtapose an appearance of high institutional 
professionalism on the one side, with the lack of skills and critical 
inexperience on the other. Therefore, concepts such as Europol’s proactive 
approach (major and coordinated attacks) and the IS underestimation of the 
problem (attempts […] have proved amateurish) are contrasted (disruption 
efforts […] curtail the group’s broadcasting capabilities), so as to let ingroup 
coordination and shared knowledge emerge as opposed to outgroup 
disorganisation. This strategy, while usefully safeguarding institutional 
decision-making identity (Hansson 2017, p. 230), also portraits intelligence 
experts as being, in turn, in the current position of fruitfully taking advantage 
of IS deficiencies (a window of opportunity to capitalise on the 
organisation’s disarray), thus reflecting well on law-enforcement behaviour 
and probably with the intent of hiding possible failures. In this way, while 
describing the other’s dismal identity as losing ground and capacity to slay 
European values and people, Europol’s ethical role and accountable identity 
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
The findings that emerge from the analysis of Europol’s reports suggest some 
final considerations. The texts analysed have quantitatively and qualitatively 
reflected the current state of raised societal insecurity in the EU and have 
conceptualised the organisation as opposed to terrorists according to group-
polarisation. Europol’s positive self-representation has often engaged the 
notion of leadership, coalition and protection, presenting the organisation as a 
unified group committed to safeguarding European well-being. Ingroup 
polarisation, has been shaped in terms of a trusted identity and ethical 
conduct and conveyed by the stability metaphor expressing a solid and 
protective identity, but also by verbs involving the notion of fight and 
evaluative modifiers endorsing the fairness of the ‘war on terror’ and 
inducing the fears of danger. Outgroup polarisation instead, has deliberately 
affected the representation of terrorists with discredit or suspicion to limit 
their ideological/organisational potential and has been used to legitimise the 
agency’s freedom “to act on behalf of what […] they take to be the rights and 
interests of the members of a society” (Dunn 1988, p. 83) and thus sustain 
ideology. In particular, the act of blaming the outgroup or crafting the other’s 
behaviour as an additional threat to security, has revealed a possible security 
inadequacy against the unpredictability of terrorism and the need to 
emphasise repressive control in the event of institutional deterioration in 
credibility.  
The study also confirms that the discursive propaganda of Europol’s 
leadership not only empowers its role in security, but also establishes 
beneficial cooperation among its partners and consolidates satisfactory public 
recognition. However, the securitisation of specific topics in times of terror, 
such as the problematisation of migration into a security question, has 
reflected an arguable and inevitably prejudicial nature of intelligence 
knowledge which is not always easy to receive acceptance from the intended 
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